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a b s t r a c t 
Wireless sensor network (WSN) plays an important role in military sensing and tracking, target tracking, 
and environment monitoring. To query of the network to get useful information from anywhere and any- 
time, we need to integrate the WSN into the Internet as part of the Internet of Things (IoT). In this case, 
it is an important task to design an access control scheme that can authorize, authenticate and revoke 
a user to access the WSN. In this paper, we propose a heterogeneous signcryption scheme to control 
the access behavior of the users. We give the formal security proof of our scheme in the random oracle 
model. An important characteristic of our scheme is to allow a user in a certiﬁcateless cryptography (CLC) 
environment to send a message to a sensor node in an identity-based cryptography (IBC) environment. 
We give an access control scheme for the WSN in the context of the IoT using the proposed signcryption 
scheme. As compared with existing two access control schemes using signcryption, the computational 
cost of sensors in our scheme is reduced by about 22% and 53%, respectively and the energy consump- 
tion of sensors in our scheme is reduced by about 33% and 54%, respectively. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
































t  1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are ad hoc networks which
usually are composed of a large number of tiny sensor nodes with
the capabilities of sensing, computation and communication [1] .
WSNs have important application value in military sensing and
tracking, target tracking, environment monitoring, and so on. For
example, we can deploy a WSN to monitor the eﬃciency of each
industrial equipment by measuring vibration, temperature, pres-
sure, power quality, and so on. If a factory personnel ﬁnd a po-
tential problem by collecting the data from the WSN, he or she
may repair or replace the equipment before the eﬃciency of the
equipment drops or the equipment fails entirely. As compared
with the traditional wired industrial monitoring system, indus-
trial WSNs have lower cost for development and maintenance and
higher ﬂexibility and intelligent process capability [2,3] . While the
WSNs provide a great ﬂexibility for establishing communications, it✩ This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China 
(grant nos. 61073176 , 61272525 , 61302161 and 61462048 ) and the Fundamental Re- 
search Funds for the Central Universities (grant no. ZYGX2013J069). 
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ave eight technical challenges for the WSNs. The ﬁfth challenge is
he security due to all the characteristics of these networks, such
s open nature of wireless communication, dynamically changing
opology, and the limited capabilities of sensor nodes in terms of
rocessing power, storage, bandwidth, and energy. The eighth chal-
enge is the integration with the Internet. To query of the WSNs
o get useful information from anywhere and anytime, we need
o integrate the WSNs into the Internet as part of the Internet of
hings (IoT). We have three methods to achieve this integration,
ront-end proxy solution, gateway solution and TCP/IP overlay so-
ution [4] . In the front-end proxy solution, the sensor nodes cannot
ommunicate with the Internet hosts directly. The base station acts
s an interface between the WSNs and the Internet and parses all
ncoming and outgoing information. That is, the users issue data
ueries to sensor nodes through the base station and the base sta-
ion forwards the corresponding results to the users. The weakness
f this solution is that the base station may become the bottleneck
nd the single point of failure. In both gateway solution and TCP/IP
verlay solution, the sensor nodes can directly communicate with
he Internet hosts. In the gateway solution, the base station plays
he role of an application layer gateway that translates the lower
ayer protocols from both networks. In the TCP/IP overlay solution,nder the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 


























































































































s  ensor nodes use TCP/IP to communicate with other nodes. The
ase station plays the role of a router that forwards the packets
rom and to the sensor nodes. 
In order to prevent abuse of the data collected by the WSNs,
nly authorized users are allowed to access the WSNs. However,
t is not an easy thing to design an access control scheme for the
SNs in the context of the IoT since the resource of the sensor
odes is very limited. 
.1. Related work 
In 2009, Le et al. [5] proposed an energy-eﬃcient access con-
rol scheme for the WSNs using elliptic curve cryptography. The
dvantage of elliptic curve cryptography is that it can afford com-
arable security level to the other public key cryptography such as
SA [6] with smaller key size. For example, to obtain the 80-bit
ecurity level, the modulus size of RSA should be 1024 bits but
he key size of elliptic curve cryptography only needs 160 bits.
n 2011, He et al. [7] proposed a privacy-preserving access con-
rol scheme for the WSNs using ring signature technique [8,9] .
he ring signature allows a signer to anonymously sign a mes-
age on behalf of a set of users including itself. It protects the
rivacy of the signer since the veriﬁer knows that the message
omes from a member of a ring, but does not know exactly who
he signer is. In 2012, Zhang et al. [10] gave a new solution for
rivacy-preserving access control scheme for the WSNs using blind
ignature technique. Yu et al. [11] gave a ﬁne-grained data ac-
ess control scheme for the WSNs using attribute-based encryp-
ion [12] . Recently, Yu et al. [13] (hereafter called YHZXZ) and
a et al. [14] (hereafter called MXH) used signcryption [15] ap-
roach to design the access control for the WSNs. The use of sign-
ryption is very novel and eﬃcient for the WSNs application be-
ause it simultaneously authenticates the users and protects the
uery messages with a low cost. Signcryption is a cryptographic
rimitive that performs both the functions of digital signature and
ublic key encryption in a logical single step, with a cost signiﬁ-
antly lower than that required by the traditional signature-then-
ncryption or encryption-then-signature methods. That is, sign-
ryption can simultaneously accomplishes conﬁdentiality, integrity,
uthentication and non-repudiation with a lower cost. However,
hese schemes [13,14] are based on the traditional public key in-
rastructure (PKI). In the PKI, each user has a private key and a
orresponding public key. In order to ensure the authenticity of
he public key, a certiﬁcate authority (CA) needs to issue a digi-
al certiﬁcate that affords an unforgeable and trusted link between
he public key and the identity of a user by the digital signature of
he CA. The main diﬃculty of the traditional PKI is the certiﬁcates
anagement, including distribution, storage and revocation. Fur-
hermore, each user should verify the validity of a certiﬁcate before
sing the public key described in this certiﬁcate. If the certiﬁcate
s valid, the public key is believable and the user can use it. Other-
ise, the user cannot use the public key in any cryptographic op-
ration. For the access control for WSNs in the context of the IoT, it
s a heavy burden for the sensor nodes to verify the validity of the
ublic key certiﬁcates. To reduce the burden of the sensor nodes,
dentity-based cryptography (IBC) [16] was proposed to design the
ecurity schemes for the WSNs [17–20] . As compared with the
raditional PKI, the main advantage of the IBC is the elimination
f public key certiﬁcates. In the IBC, a user’s public key is com-
uted from its identity information, such as telephone numbers,
P addresses and email addresses. There exist a trusted third party
alled private key generator (PKG) who is in charge of the gener-
tion of private keys for all users. Authenticity of a public key is
xplicitly veriﬁed without a certiﬁcate. So the IBC is a good choice
or design the security for the WSNs. However, the lightweight IBC
as the key escrow problem since the PKG knows all users’ pri-ate keys [16] . IBC is only suitable for small networks, such as the
SNs, and is not suitable for large-scale networks, such as the In-
ernet. For design an access control scheme for the WSNs in the
ontext of the IoT, a possible solution is that the WSNs part uses
he IBC and the Internet part uses the PKI. There exist such sign-
ryption schemes [21,22] . However, in these solutions, when an In-
ernet user issues a query to the WSNs, the sensor nodes need to
heck if the Internet user has been authorized. The sensor nodes
till need to verify the public key certiﬁcate since the Internet user
elongs to the PKI. 
.2. Motivation and contribution 
The motivation of the paper is to design a practical access con-
rol scheme without certiﬁcates for WSNs in the context of the IoT.
nly authorized Internet users can access the WSNs and the query
essages are protected. The protection of the query messages is
ery important for preserving the privacy of the users [14] . Dif-
erent to [13] and [14] , our solution uses a novel heterogeneous
igncryption (HSC) in which the senders belong to the certiﬁcate-
ess cryptography (CLC) environment [23] and the receivers belong
o the IBC environment. The CLC does not require the use of cer-
iﬁcates and yet does not has the built-in key escrow problem of
BC. The CLC still needs a trusted third party called the key gener-
ting center (KGC) who is responsible for generating a partial pri-
ate key using a user’s identity and a master key. The user then
ombines the partial private key with some secret value to gen-
rate a full private key which is unknown to the KGC. We show
hat the novel heterogeneous signcryption scheme has the indistin-
uishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2)
nder the gap bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman (GBDH) problem and ex-
stential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks
EUF-CMA) under the gap Diﬃe–Hellman (GDH) and computa-
ional Diﬃe–Hellman (CDH) problems in the random oracle model.
n important characteristic of our scheme is heterogeneous. That
s, senders and receivers belong to two different cryptographic en-
ironments. It allows a sender in the CLC environment to transmit
 message to a receiver in the IBC environment. In addition, our
cheme has the ciphertext authenticity that allows we shift the
omputational cost of the sensor nodes to the gateway. We give
n access control scheme for the WSNs in the context of the IoT
sing the novel signcryption scheme. As compared with existing
wo access control schemes using signcryption, the computational
ost of the sensor node in our scheme is reduced by about 22% and
3%, respectively and the energy consumption of the sensor node
n our scheme is reduced by about 33% and 54%, respectively. 
.3. Organization 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. The network
odel, security requirements and bilinear pairings are introduced
n Section 2 . The novel heterogeneous signcryption scheme is pro-
osed in Section 3 . We give the access control scheme for the
SNs in the context of the IoT in Section 4 . Finally, the conclu-
ions are given in Section 5 . 
. Preliminaries 
In this section, we give the network model, security require-
ents and bilinear pairings. 
.1. Network model 
Fig. 1 shows the overview of the network model. The model
onsists of four kinds of entities, a service provider (SP), the sen-
or nodes, a gateway and the Internet hosts (users). The SP deploys
156 F. Li et al. / Computer Communications 89–90 (2016) 154–164 






























































cide if DBDH (P , aP , bP , cP , T ) =  or ⊥ . a WSN that collects the monitoring data. The users who want to
access the WSN should be authorized by the SP. Anyone without
authorization cannot access the WSN. The SP takes charge of the
registration for sensor nodes and users and generates the private
keys for sensor nodes and partial private keys for users. That is,
the SP plays the role of PKG in the IBC environment and the KGC
in the CLC environment. The sensor nodes have limited computa-
tional power and storage resource while the gateway has higher
processing and storage capability. We assume that the SP is always
trusted and can never be compromised and the gateway is honest
and curious. When a user hope to access the data of the WSN, it
sends a query message to a sensor node. The gateway ﬁrst checks
if the user has been authorized to access the data. If yes, the gate-
way forwards the query to the sensor node and the node transmits
collected data to the user in a secure way. Otherwise, the gateway
rejects the query request. Our scheme proposed in this paper can
be used in both gateway solution and TCP/IP overlay solution. 
2.2. Security requirements 
The communication between the Internet hosts and sensor
nodes should satisfy conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication, and
non-repudiation. Conﬁdentiality is keeping query messages secret
from the others except the Internet hosts and sensor nodes. Even
the gateway cannot know the contents of the message. Integrity is
ensuring that the query messages from the Internet hosts have not
been altered by unauthorized entities. Authentication is the assur-
ance that only the authorized Internet hosts can access the WSN.
Non-repudiation is preventing the denial of previous queries issued
by the Internet hosts. That is, if an Internet host has sent a query
message to a sensor node, it cannot deny its action. In addition,
we hope that this communication also satisﬁes ciphertext authen-
ticity and insider security. The ciphertext authenticity means that a
third party can verify the validity of a ciphertext without knowing
the query message. The insider security has two aspects. The ﬁrst
aspect is the insider security for conﬁdentiality and the other as-
pect is the insider security for unforgeability. The insider security
for conﬁdentiality guarantees the forward security of signcryption,
i.e. conﬁdentiality is kept in case the host’s private key is compro-ised. The insider security for unforgeability means that an adver-
ary cannot forge a ciphertext with the sensor node’s private key. 
.3. Bilinear pairings 
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups with same prime order p .
 1 is an additive group and G 2 is a multiplicative group. Let P be
 generator of G 1 . A bilinear pairing is a map ˆ e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 that
atisﬁes the following properties [16] : 
1. Bilinearity: ˆ e(aP, bQ ) = ˆ e(P, Q ) ab for all P , Q ∈ G 1 , a, b ∈ Z ∗p . 
2. Non-degeneracy: There are P , Q ∈ G 1 such that ˆ e(P, Q )  = 1 ,
where 1 is the identity element of G 2 . 
3. Computability: ˆ e(P, Q ) can be eﬃciently computed for all P , Q
∈ G 1 . 
The modiﬁed Weil pairing and Tate pairing provide ad-
issible maps of this kind. For more details, please refer
o [16] . The security of our scheme relies on the following hard
roblems. 
eﬁnition 1. Given groups G 1 and G 2 with the same prime order
 , a generator P of G 1 and a bilinear map ˆ e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , 
• The computational Diﬃe–Hellman (CDH) problem in G 1 is to
compute abP given ( P , aP , bP ). 
• The bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman (BDH) problem in (G 1 , G 2 , ˆ  e) is to
compute T = ˆ e(P, P ) abc given ( P , aP , bP , cP ). 
• The decisional bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman (DBDH) problem in
(G 1 , G 2 , ˆ  e) is to decide whether T = ˆ e(P, P ) abc or not given ( P ,
aP , bP , cP ) and an element T ∈ G 2 . If T = ˆ e(P, P ) abc , we denote it
by DBDH (P , aP , bP , cP , T ) =  . Otherwise, we denote it by DBDH
(P , aP , bP , cP , T ) = ⊥ . 
• The gap bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman (GBDH) problem in (G 1 , G 2 , ˆ  e)
is to compute T = ˆ e(P, P ) abc given ( P , aP , bP , cP ) with the help
of the DBDH oracle that can decide if DBDH (P , aP , bP , cP , T ) =
 or ⊥ . 
• The gap Diﬃe—Hellman (GDH) problem in G 1 is to compute abP
given ( P , aP , bP ) with the help of the DBDH oracle that can de-


















































































































T  . A heterogeneous signcryption scheme 
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the formal deﬁnition and se-
urity notions of heterogeneous signcryption scheme that allows a
ender in the CLC environment to transmit a message to a receiver
n the IBC environment. For simplicity, we use CI-HSC to denote
his type of signcryption in the following content. Then we pro-
ose an eﬃcient CI-HSC scheme and prove its security in the ran-
om oracle model. 
.1. Syntax 
A generic CI-HSC scheme consists of the following eight algo-
ithms. 
Setup : It is a probabilistic algorithm performed by a PKG that
akes as input a security parameter k , and outputs a master se-
ret key s and the system parameters params that includes a mas-
er public key P pub . For simplicity, we omit the system parameters
arams in the other algorithms in the following content. 
CL-PPKE : It is a partial private key extraction algorithm run by
he PKG that takes as input the master secret key s and a user’s
dentity ID , and returns a partial private key D ID . The PKG sends
he partial private key to the user in a secure way. 
CL-SVS : It is a secret value setup algorithm run by the users that
akes as input an identity ID , and returns a secret value x ID . 
CL-PKS : It is a private key setup algorithm run by the users that
akes as input a partial private key D ID and a secret value x ID , and
utputs a full private key S ID . 
CL-PKG : It is a public key generation algorithm run by the users
hat takes as input a secret value x ID , and outputs a public key PK ID .
he public key is published without a certiﬁcate. 
IB-KE : It is a key extraction algorithm run by the PKG that takes
s input the master secret key s and a user’s identity ID , and re-
urns a private key S ID . The PKG sends the private key to the user
n a secure way. 
SC : It is a probabilistic signcryption algorithm performed by a
ender that takes as input a plaintext message m , a sender’s full
rivate key S ID s , identity ID s and public key P K ID s and a receiver’s
dentity ID r , and outputs a ciphertext σ . 
USC : It is a deterministic unsigncryption algorithm performed
y a receiver that takes as input a ciphertext σ , a sender’s identity
D s and public key P K ID s and a receiver’s private key S ID r and iden-
ity ID r , and outputs a plaintext m or a failure symbol ⊥ if σ is not
 valid ciphertext between the sender and the receiver. 
The above algorithms should satisfy the consistency constraint
f CI-HSC, i.e. if 
= SC (m, S ID s , ID s , P K ID s , ID r ) , 
hen we have 
 = USC (σ, ID s , P K ID s , S ID r , ID r ) . 
ote that the CL-PPKE , CL-SVS , CL-PKS and CL-PKG are for users in
he CLC environments and the IBC-KE algorithm is for users in the
BC environments. If the trusted third party in the CLC and IBC en-
ironments are different, we need to generate different master se-
ret keys and corresponding master public key. In this paper, we
hink the trusted third party in the CLC and IBC environments is
he same (please see Section 2 ). In such an assumption, the role of
L-PPKE and IB-KE is the same. 
.2. Security notions 
A signcryption scheme should satisfy conﬁdentiality (i.e. in-
istinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-
CA2)) and unforgeability (i.e. existential unforgeability againstdaptive chosen messages attacks (EUF-CMA)). We modify the no-
ions in [24,25] slightly to adapt for CI-HSC. 
For conﬁdentiality, we consider the following game played be-
ween an adversary A and a challenger C. 
Initial : C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and
ives the system parameters params to A . 
Phase 1 : A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries
n an adaptive manner. 
• Partial private key extraction queries: A chooses an identity ID
and sends it to C . C runs CL-PPKE algorithm and sends corre-
sponding secret key D ID to A . 
• Private key setup queries: When receiving an identity ID from
A , C runs CL-PKS algorithm and sends the full private key S ID to
A ( C may ﬁrst run CL-PPKE and CL-SVS algorithms if necessary).
• Public key queries: A chooses an identity ID and sends it to C.
C runs CL-PKG algorithm and sends the public key PK ID to A ( C
may ﬁrst run CL-SVS algorithm if necessary). 
• Public key replacement queries: A may replace a public key
PK ID with a value chosen by it. 
• Key extraction queries: When receiving an identity ID from A ,
C runs IB-KE algorithm and sends the corresponding private key
S ID to A . 
• Signcryption queries: A chooses a message m , a sender’s iden-
tity ID i and a receiver’s identity ID j , C ﬁrst runs CL-PKS and CL-
PKG algorithms to get the private key S ID i and public key P K ID i ,
respectively. Then C sends the result of SC (m, S ID i , ID i , P K ID i , ID j )
to A . It is possible that C does not know the sender’s secret
value, if the associated public key has been replaced. In this
case, we require A to provide it. 
• Unsigncryption queries: A chooses a ciphertext σ , a sender’s
identity ID i and a receiver’s identity ID j , C ﬁrst runs IB-KE
and CL-PKG algorithms to get the private key S ID j and the
public key P K ID i , respectively. Then C sends the result of
USC (σ, ID i , P K ID i , S ID j , ID j ) to A . The result is either a plaintext
message m or a symbol ⊥ . 
Challenge : A decides when phase 1 ends. A generates two
qual length plaintexts ( m 0 , m 1 ), a sender’s identity ID s and a re-
eiver’s identity ID r on which it wishes to be challenged. Note
hat ID r should not be submitted to a key extraction query in
he phase 1. C takes a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and computes σ ∗ =
C (m β, S ID s , ID s , P K ID s , ID r ) which is sent to A . 
Phase 2 : A may make a polynomially bounded number of
ueries adaptively again as in the phase 1. However, this time, it
annot make a key extraction query on ID r and cannot make an
nsigncryption query on ( σ ∗, ID s , ID r ) to obtain the corresponding
laintext unless the public key P K ID s has been replaced after the
hallenge phase. 
Guess : A produces a bit β ′ and wins the game if β ′ = β . 
The advantage of A is deﬁned as Adv (A ) = | 2 Pr [ β ′ = β] − 1 | ,
here Pr [ β ′ = β] denotes the probability that β ′ = β . 
eﬁnition 2. A CI-HSC scheme is ( , t , q ppk , q sk , q pk , q pkr , q k ,
 s , q u )-IND-CCA2 secure if there does not exist a probabilistic t -
olynomial time adversary A that has advantage at least  after
t most q ppk partial private key extraction queries, q sk private key
etup queries, q pk public key queries, q pkr public key replacement
ueries, q k key extraction queries, q s signcryption queries and q u 
nsigncryption queries in the conﬁdentiality game. 
The above deﬁnition grasps insider security for conﬁdential-
ty of signcryption since the adversary knows all senders’ private
eys [26] . The insider security guarantees the forward security of
igncryption scheme, i.e. conﬁdentiality is kept in case the sender’s
rivate key is compromised. 
For unforgeability, we need consider two types of adversaries,
ype I and Type II [23,27] , since the senders belong to the CLC en-











































































svironment. A Type I adversary models an attacker which is a com-
mon user and does not have the KGC’s master secret key. But it
can adaptively replace users’ public keys with (valid) public keys
of its choice. A Type II adversary models an honest-but-curious
KGC who knows the KGC’s master secret key. But it cannot replace
users’ public keys. 
Now let us consider the unforgeability game played between a
challenger C and the Type I adversary F I . 
Initial: C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and
gives the system parameters params to F I . 
Attack: F I performs a polynomially bounded number of queries
just like in the conﬁdentiality game. 
Forgery : F I produces a ciphertext σ ∗, a sender’s identity ID s and
a receiver’s identity ID r and succeeds if the following conditions
hold: 
1. USC (σ ∗, ID s , P K ID s , S ID r , ID r ) = m ∗. 
2. F I has not made a private key setup query for ID s . 
3. F I cannot both make a public key replacement query for ID s 
before forgery phase and make a partial private key extraction
query in some phase. 
4. F I has not asked a signcryption query on ( m ∗, ID s , ID r ). 
The advantage of F I is deﬁned as the probability that it wins. 
Deﬁnition 3. A CI-HSC scheme is ( , t , q ppk , q sk , q pk , q pkr , q k , q s ,
q u )-Type-I-EUF-CMA secure if there does not exist a probabilistic
t -polynomial time adversary F I that has advantage at least  after
at most q ppk partial private key extraction queries, q sk private key
setup queries, q pk public key queries, q pkr public key replacement
queries, q k key extraction queries, q s signcryption queries and q u 
unsigncryption queries in the Type I unforgeability game. 
Finally, let us consider the unforgeability game played between
a challenger C and the Type II adversary F II . 
Initial: C runs Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and
gives both the system parameters params and the master secret
key s to F II . 
Attack: F II performs a polynomially bounded number of private
key setup queries, public key queries and signcryption queries just
like in the conﬁdentiality game. Note that we do not need the
partial private key extraction, key extraction and unsigncryption
queries since F II can do it by itself. 
Forgery : F II outputs a ciphertext σ ∗, a sender’s identity ID s and
a receiver’s identity ID r and succeeds if the following conditions
hold: 
1. USC (σ ∗, ID s , P K ID s , S ID r , ID r ) = m ∗. 
2. F II has not made a private key setup query for ID s . 
3. F II has not asked a signcryption query on ( m ∗, ID s , ID r ). 
The advantage of F II is deﬁned as the probability that it suc-
ceeds. 
Deﬁnition 4. A CI-HSC scheme is ( , t , q sk , q pk , q s )-Type-II-EUF-
CMA secure if there does not exist a probabilistic t -polynomial
time adversary F II that has advantage at least  after at most q sk 
private key setup queries, q pk public key queries and q s signcryp-
tion queries in the Type II unforgeability game. 
Deﬁnition 5. A CI-HSC scheme is EUF-CMA secure if it is both
Type I EUF-CMA and Type II EUF-CMA secure. 
In the above Deﬁnitions 3 and 4 , we also allow the adversary
to know the receiver’s private key S ID r . That is, the deﬁnition also
grasps the insider security for unforgeability of signcryption [26] . 
3.3. The proposed scheme 
The proposed CI-HSC consists of the following eight algorithms.Setup : Given a security parameter k , the PKG selects an ad-
itive group G 1 and a multiplicative G 2 of the same prime or-
er p , a generator P of G 1 , a bilinear map ˆ e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , and
our secure hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} 
∗ → G 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} ∗ → {0,
} n , H 3 : {0, 1} 
∗ → G 1 and H 4 : {0, 1} ∗ → G 1 . Here n is the
umber of bits of a message to be sent. The PKG randomly se-
ects a master secret key s ∈ Z ∗p and computes the correspond-
ng public key P pub = sP . The PKG publishes the system parameters
 G 1 , G 2 , p, ˆ  e, n, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 } and keeps s secret. 
CL-PPKE : A user submits its identity ID to the PKG. The PKG
omputes Q ID = H 1 (ID ) and sends the partial private key D ID = sQ ID 
o the user. 
CL-SVS : A user with identity ID chooses a random x ID ∈ Z p as
he secret value. 
CL-PKS : Given a partial private key D ID and a secret value x ID ,
his algorithm returns the full private key S ID = (x ID , D ID ) . 
CL-PKG : Given a secret value x ID , this algorithm returns the pub-
ic key P K ID = x ID P . 
IB-KE : A user submits its identity ID to the PKG. The PKG com-
utes Q ID = H 1 (ID ) and sends the private key S ID = sQ ID to the user.
SC : Given a message m , a sender’s full private key S ID s , identity
D s and public key P K ID s , and a receiver’s identity ID r , this algo-
ithm works as follows. 
1. Choose r ∈ Z ∗p randomly. 
2. Compute U = rP and T = ˆ e(P pub , Q ID r ) r . 
3. Compute h = H 2 (U, T , ID r ) . 
4. Compute C = m ⊕ h . 
5. Compute X = H 3 (U, C, ID s , P K ID s ) . 
6. Compute Y = H 4 (U, C, ID s , P K ID s ) . 
7. Compute V = D ID s + rX + x ID s Y 
8. Output the ciphertext σ = (U, C, V ) . 
USC : Given a ciphertext σ = (U, C, V ) , a sender’s identity ID s 
nd public key P K ID s , and a receiver’s private key S ID r and identity
D r , this algorithm works as follows. 
1. Compute X = H 3 (U, C, ID s , P K ID s ) . 
2. Compute Y = H 4 (U, C, ID s , P K ID s ) . 
3. Check if 
ˆ e(P, V ) = ˆ e(P pub , Q ID s ) ˆ  e(U, X ) ˆ  e(P K ID s , Y ) 
holds. If yes, perform the following step 4. Otherwise, reject
this ciphertext and output the symbol ⊥ . 
4. Compute T = ˆ e(U, S ID r ) . 
5. Compute h = H 2 (U, T , ID r ) . 
6. Recover the message m = C ⊕ h . 
.4. Security 
We prove that the CI-HSC satisﬁes the conﬁdentiality and un-
orgeability by following Theorems 1 and 2 , respectively. 
heorem 1. In the random oracle model, if there exist an adversary
 that has a non-negligible advantage  against the IND-CCA2 secu-
ity of the CI-HSC when running in a time t and executing q ppk par-
ial private key extraction queries, q sk private key setup queries, q pk 
ublic key queries, q pkr public key replacement queries, q k key extrac-
ion queries, q s signcryption queries, q u unsigncryption queries and
 H i 
queries to hash oracles H i ( i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ), then we can construct
n algorithm C that can solve the GBDH problem with an advantage 
′ ≥ 
q H 1 
(
1 − q s (q s + q H 3 ) 
2 k 
)
n a time t ′ ≤ t + O (q s + q u ) t p , where t p is the cost for one pairing
peration. 
roof. In this proof, we show how C uses A as a subroutine to
olve a random instance ( P , aP , bP , cP ) of the GBDH problem. 






































































































p sk  Initial: C gives A the system parameters params with P pub = aP .
ote that C does not know the a . In this game, a simulates the
ecret key of the PKG. 
Phase 1 : C acts as A ’s challenger in the above IND-CCA2 game.
keeps four lists L 1 , L 2 , L 3 and L 4 to simulate the hash oracles H 1 ,
 2 , H 3 and H 4 , respectively. In addition, C maintains a list L k that is
nitially empty to keep the public key information. We assume that
 1 queries are different and that A will ask H 1 ( ID ) before the iden-
ity ID is used in the other queries. In addition, we assume that the
ender’s identity is different to the receiver’s identity by irreﬂexiv-
ty assumption [28] . C chooses a random number λ ∈ { 1 , 2 , . . . , q H 1 }
nd answers A ’s queries as follows. 
• H 1 queries: A chooses an identity and submits it to C. At the
λth H 1 query, C answers by H 1 (ID λ) = bP and inserts ( ID λ, ⊥ )
into the list L 1 . For i th H 1 query ( i  = λ), C randomly chooses
e i ∈ Z ∗p , inserts ( ID i , e i ) into the list L 1 and answers H 1 (ID i ) =
e i P . 
• H 2 queries: When A asks a H 2 query on ( U i , T i , ID i ), C does the
following steps: 
1. If DBDH (aP , bP , cP , T i ) =  , C returns T i and stops. 
2. If the list L 2 contains entries ( U i ,  , ID i , h i ) such that DBDH
(aP , bP , U i , T i ) =  , C returns h i and updates the symbol 
with T i . Note that in this case I D i = I D λ. 
3. If C reaches this point of execution, C randomly chooses a
value and returns it to A . The query and the answer will be
stored in the list. Note that C should maintain the consis-
tency and avoid collision for these answers. 
• H 3 queries: For a H 3 query on (U i , C i , ID i , P K ID i ) , C ﬁrst checks if
the list L 3 contains a tuple (U i , C i , ID i , P K ID i , t i , t i P ) . If such a tu-
ple is found, C returns t i P to A . Otherwise, C chooses a random
t ∈ Z ∗p , inserts the (U i , C i , ID i , P K ID i , t , t P ) into the list L 3 , and re-
turns tP to A . 
• H 4 queries: For a H 4 query on (U i , C i , ID i , P K ID i ) , C ﬁrst checks
if the list L 4 contains a tuple (U i , C i , ID i , P K ID i , w i , w i P ) . If such
a tuple is found, C returns w i P to A . Otherwise, C chooses a
random w ∈ Z ∗p , inserts the (U i , C i , ID i , P K ID i , w, wP ) into the list
L 4 , and returns wP to A . 
• Partial private key extraction queries: A can choose an identity
ID i and ask its partial private key. If I D i = I D λ, then C fails and
stops. Otherwise the list L 1 should contain ( ID i , e i ) for some e i 
(this shows C previously answered H 1 (ID i ) = e i P ). C returns the
partial private key D ID i = e i aP . 
• Private key setup queries: When A asks a private key setup
query on an identity ID i , if I D i = I D λ, C aborts. Otherwise, C
runs H 1 oracle to obtain ( ID i , e i ). Then C searches L k for the
entry (ID i , P K ID i , x ID i ) ( C generates a new key pair if this entry
does not exist) and returns S ID i = (x ID i , e i aP ) . 
• Public key queries: A chooses an identity ID and sends it to
C. If the list L k contains a tuple (ID i , P K ID i , x ID i ) , then C returns
P K ID i to A . Otherwise, C chooses a random x ID i ∈ Z ∗p , computes
P K ID i = x ID i P, inserts (ID i , P K ID i , x ID i ) into the list L k and returns
P K ID i to A . 
• Public key replacement queries: A may replace a public key
PK ID with a value chosen by it. For a public key replace-
ment query for (ID i , P K ID i ) , C updates the list L k with tuple
(ID i , P K ID i , ⊥ ) . 
• Key extraction queries: When receiving an identity ID i from A ,
if I D i = I D λ, then C fails and stops. Otherwise the list L 1 should
contain ( ID i , e i ) for some e i . C returns the private key S ID i = e i aP .
• Signcryption queries: When A chooses a message m , a sender’s
identity ID i and a receiver’s identity ID j and makes a signcryp-
tion query, C proceeds as follows. 
1. If ID i  = ID λ, C ﬁrst runs private key setup oracle to get S ID i 
and public key oracle to get P K ID i . Then C can answer A by
simply running SC (m, S ID i , ID i , P K ID i , ID j ) . 2. If I D i = I D λ, C chooses u, v ∈ Z ∗p , sets U = v aP, and computes
T = ˆ e(U, S ID j ) ( C could obtain S ID j by running key extrac-
tion oracle). Then C sets V = uaP + w i P K ID i and deﬁnes the
hash value H 3 (U, C, ID i , P K ID i ) as v 
−1 (uP − Q ID i ) ( C could ob-
tain P K ID i by running public key oracle and w i from the list
L 4 ). C fails if H 3 (U, C, ID i , P K ID i ) is already deﬁned but this
case only happens with probability (q s + q H 3 ) / 2 k . C makes
the H 2 query on ( U , T , ID j ) to get h and computes C = m ⊕ h .
Finally, C returns σ = (U, C, V ) to A 
• Unsigncryption queries: A chooses a ciphertext σ = (U, C, V ) , a
sender’s identity ID i and a receiver’s identity ID j , C proceeds as
follows. 
1. Compute X = H 3 (U, C, ID i , P K ID i ) and Y = H 4 (U, C, ID i , P K ID i )
and check if 
ˆ e(P, V ) = ˆ e(P pub , Q ID i ) ˆ  e(U, X ) ˆ  e(P K ID i , Y ) 
holds. If yes, perform the following step 2. Otherwise, reject
this query and output the symbol ⊥ . 
2. If ID j  = ID λ, C runs the key extraction oracle to get S ID j and
computes T = ˆ e(U, S ID j ) . C then runs H 2 oracle to get h =
H 2 (U, T , ID j ) and returns m = C ⊕ h . 
3. If I D j = I D λ, C cannot get the S ID j by the key extraction or-
acle. In this case, T cannot be computed. To return a consis-
tent answer, C goes through the list L 2 and looks for a tu-
ple ( U , T , ID j , h ), for different values of T , such that DBDH
(aP , bP , U, T ) =  . If such an entry exists, the correct T is
found and returns m = C ⊕ h . 
4. If C reaches this point of execution, it places the entry ( U ,  ,
ID j , h ) for a random h on the list L 2 and returns m = C ⊕ h .
The symbol  denotes an unknown value of T . Note that the
identity component of all entries with the symbol  is ID λ. 
Challenge: A generates two equal length plaintexts ( m 0 , m 1 ),
 sender’s identity ID s and a receiver’s identity ID r on which it
ishes to be challenged. If ID r  = ID λ, C aborts. Otherwise C takes
 random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and signcrypts m β . To do so, it chooses
 random hash value h ∗ and sets U ∗ = cP, C ∗ = m β ⊕ h ∗ and V ∗ =
 ID s + rX + x ID s Y = D ID s + tcP + wP K ID s , where D ID s can be obtained
y running private key setup oracle, t is obtained from the list L 3 ,
nd w is obtained from the list L 4 . C sends the challenge ciphertext
∗ = (U ∗, C ∗, V ∗) to A . 
Phase 2: A makes a polynomially bounded number of queries
daptively again as in the phase 1 with the limitation that: (1) it
annot make a key extraction query on ID r ; (2) it cannot ask an
nsigncryption query on ( σ ∗, ID s , ID r ) to obtain the corresponding
laintext unless the public key P K ID s has been replaced after the
hallenge phase. C answer A ’s queries as in the phase 1. 
Guess: A produces a bit β ′ which is ignored by C. 
Since the list L 1 contains no more than q H 1 elements, A will
utput the identity ID λ with probability 1 /q H 1 . If this event hap-
ens, the simulation is perfect unless A makes a H 2 query on the
hallenge-related tuple ( U ∗, T ∗, ID λ). Since the hash function H 2 is
odeled as a random oracle, A will not have any advantage if this
uple does not appear on the list L 2 . However, if this case happens,
will solve the GBDH problem due to the ﬁrst step in the simula-
ion of H 2 . In the whole simulation, C makes at most q 2 H 2 + q H 2 q u 
BDH oracle. 
heorem 2. In the random oracle model, the proposed scheme satis-
es the EUF-CMA security under the CDH assumptions. 
roof. This theorem follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. 
emma 1. In the random oracle model, if there exist an adversary
 I that has a non-negligible advantage  against the Type I EUF-CMA
ecurity of the CI-HSC when running in a time t and performing q ppk 
artial private key extraction queries, q private key setup queries,













































































q pk public key queries, q pkr public key replacement queries, q k key
extraction queries, q s signcryption queries, q u unsigncryption queries
and q H i queries to hash oracles H i ( i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ), then we can con-
struct an algorithm C that can solve the GDH problem with an ad-
vantage 
′ ≥ 
q H 1 
(
1 − q s (q s + q H 3 ) 
2 k 
)
in a time t ′ ≤ t + O (q s + q u ) t p , where t p is the cost for one pairing
operation. 
Proof. In this proof, we show how C uses F I as a subroutine to
solve a random instance ( P , aP , bP ) of the GDH problem. 
Initial: C gives F I the system parameters params with P pub = aP .
Note that C does not know the a . In this game, a simulates the
secret key of the PKG. 
Attack: C answers F I ’s queries according to the proof of
Theorem 1 except the H 2 queries. When F I asks a H 2 query on ( U i ,
T i , ID i ), C ﬁrst checks if the list L 2 contains a tuple ( U i , T i , ID i , h i ).
If such a tuple is found, C returns h i to F I . Otherwise, C chooses a
random h ∈ {0, 1} n , inserts the ( U i , T i , ID i , h ) into the list L 2 , and
returns h to F I . 
Forgery: F I outputs a ciphertext σ ∗ = (U ∗, C ∗, V ∗) , a sender’s
identity ID s and a receiver’s identity ID r . C checks if I D s = I D λ. If
not, it aborts. Otherwise, it retrieves t from the list L 3 by querying
H 3 on (U 
∗, C ∗, ID s , P K ID s ) and w from the list L 4 by querying H 4 on
(U ∗, C ∗, ID s , P K ID s ) . Note that if F wins this game, the ciphertext σ ∗
must be valid. That is, we have 
ˆ e(P, V ∗) = ˆ e(P pub , Q ID s ) ˆ  e(U ∗, tP ) ˆ  e(P K ID s , wP ) 
= ˆ e(aP, bP ) ˆ  e(U ∗, tP ) ˆ  e(P K ID s , wP ) 
Thus C can compute 
abP = V ∗ − tU ∗ − wP K ID s . 
Let us now analyze the probability that C succeeds in solving
the GDH problem instance. The probability that C aborts the simu-
lation is related with the following events: 
• E 1 : F I does not choose the identity ID λ. 
• E 2 : F I made a private key setup query on ID λ. 
• E 3 F I made a public key replacement query for ID s before the
challenge phase and make a partial private key extraction query
for ID s in some phase. 
• E 4 : C aborts in a signcryption query because of a collision on
H 3 . 
We know that Pr [ ¬ E 1 ] = 1 /q H 1 and Pr [ E 4 ] ≤ q s (q s + q H 3 ) / 2 k . In
addition, we know that ¬E 1 implies ¬E 2 and ¬E 3 . 
Therefore, we have 
′ ≥ 
q H 1 
(




In the whole simulation, C makes at most q H 2 q u DBDH oracle. 
Lemma 2. In the random oracle model, if there exist an adversary
F II that has a non-negligible advantage  against the Type II EUF-
CMA security of the CI-HSC when running in a time t and executing
q sk private key setup queries, q pk public key queries, q s signcryption
queries and q H i queries to hash oracles H i ( i = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ), then we can
construct an algorithm C that can solve the CDH problem with an
advantage 
′ ≥ 
q sk + q pk + q s + 1 
(




in a time t ′ ≤ t + O (q s + q u ) t p , where t p is the cost for one pairing
operation. roof. We show how C uses F II as a subroutine to solve a random
nstance ( P , aP , bP ) of the CDH problem. 
Initial: C gives F II the system parameters params with P pub = sP .
ere s is chosen randomly by C. 
Attack: C simulates F II ’s challenger in the Type II EUF-CMA
ame. C keeps four lists L 1 , L 2 , L 3 and L 4 to simulate the hash
racles H 1 , H 2 , H 3 and H 4 , respectively. In addition, C maintains
 list L k that is initially empty to keep the public key informa-
ion. We assume that public key queries are different and that F II 
ill ask H 1 ( ID ) before the identity ID is used in the other queries.
n addition, we assume that the sender’s identity is different to
he receiver’s identity by irreﬂexivity assumption [28] . C chooses
 random number λ ∈ { 1 , 2 , . . . , q sk + q pk + q s + 1 } . C answers H 2 ,
 3 and signcryption queries according to the same method of the
heorem 1 . The other queries are explained as follows. 
• H 1 queries: When F II asks a H 1 query on ID i , C ﬁrst checks if
the list L 1 contains a pair ( ID i , e i ). If such a pair is found, C
returns e i P to F II . Otherwise, C chooses a random e ∈ Z ∗p , inserts
the ( ID i , e ) into the list L 1 , and returns eP to F II . 
• H 4 queries: For a H 4 query on (U i , C i , ID i , P K ID i ) , C ﬁrst checks
if the list L 4 contains a tuple (U i , C i , ID i , P K ID i , w i , w i bP ) . If such
a tuple is found, C returns w i bP to F II . Otherwise, C chooses
a random w ∈ Z ∗p , inserts the (U i , C i , ID i , P K ID i , w, wbP ) into the
list L 4 , and returns wbP to F II . 
• Private key setup queries: When F II asks a private key setup
query on an identity ID i , if I D i = I D λ, C aborts. Otherwise, C
runs H 1 oracle to obtain ( ID i , e i ). Then C searches L k for the
entry (ID i , P K ID i , x ID i ) ( C generates a new key pair if this entry
does not exist) and returns S ID i = (x ID i , se i P ) . 
• Public key queries: F II chooses an identity ID i and sends it to
C . If ID i  = ID λ, C chooses a random x ID i ∈ Z ∗p , computes P K ID i =
x ID i P, inserts (ID i , P K ID i , x ID i ) into the list L k and returns P K ID i to
F II . Otherwise, C returns aP and inserts ( ID λ, aP , ⊥ ) into the list
L k . 
Forgery: F II outputs a ciphertext σ ∗ = (U ∗, C ∗, V ∗) , a sender’s
dentity ID s and a receiver’s identity ID r . C checks if I D s = I D λ. If
ot, it aborts. Otherwise, it retrieves t from the list L 3 by querying
 3 on (U 
∗, C ∗, ID s , P K ID s ) and w from the list L 4 by querying H 4 on
(U ∗, C ∗, ID s , P K ID s ) . Note that if F II wins this game, the ciphertext∗ must be valid. That is, we have 
ˆ (P, V ∗) = ˆ e(P pub , Q ID s ) ˆ  e(U ∗, tP ) ˆ  e(P K ID s , wbP ) 
= ˆ e(sP, Q ID s ) ˆ  e(U ∗, tP ) ˆ  e(aP, wbP ) 
herefore, we have 
ˆ (P, V ∗) = ˆ e(P, sQ ID s ) ˆ  e(tU ∗, P ) ˆ  e(P, wabP ) 
hus C can compute 
bP = w −1 (V ∗ − tU ∗ − sQ ID s ) 
Let us now analyze the probability that C succeeds in solving
he CDH problem instance. The probability that C aborts the simu-
ation is related with the following events: 
• E 1 : F II does not choose the identity ID λ. 
• E 2 : F II made a private key setup query on ID λ. 
• E 3 : C aborts in a signcryption query because of a collision on
H 3 . 
We know that Pr [ ¬ E 1 ] = 1 / (q sk + q pk + q s + 1) and Pr [ E 3 ] ≤
 s (q s + q H 3 ) / 2 k . In addition, we know that ¬E 1 implies ¬E 2 . Note
hat the maximum length of the list L k is q sk + q pk + q s + 1 . 
Therefore, we have 
′ ≥ 
q sk + q pk + q s + 1 
(
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o  . A practical access control scheme 
In this section, we propose a practical access control scheme
or the WSNs in the context of the IoT using the proposed CI-
SC scheme. Our scheme uses identity-based access control (IBAC)
odel [29,30] . The IBAC is a simple and practical access control
odel that associates access privilege with speciﬁc users. The pro-
osed scheme consists of four phases: the initialization phase, the
egistration phase, the authentication and authorization phase, and
he revocation phase. In this scheme, the SP plays the role of PKG
n the IBC environment and the KGC in the CLC environment. The
roposed access control scheme is summarized in Fig. 2 . 
.1. Initialization phase 
In this phase, the SP runs Setup algorithm and deploys the
SNs. Each sensor node is assigned an identity ID and a private
ey S ID (the SP runs IB-KE algorithm to generate the private key
 ID ). 
.2. Registration phase 
An Internet user should register with the SP to obtain the ac-
ess privilege of the WSNs. The user ﬁrst submits its identity ID to
he SP. Then the SP checks if the identity is valid. If the identity
s not valid, the SP rejects this registration. Otherwise the SP runs
L-PPKE algorithm to get the partial private key D ID = sQ ID . After
eceiving D ID , the Internet user runs CL-SVS algorithm to set the
ecret value x ID ∈ Z ∗p and then runs CL-PKS to obtain the full pri-
ate key S ID = (x ID , D ID ) . Finally, the user runs CL-PKG algorithm to
ets the public key P K ID = x ID P . 
.3. Authentication and authorization phase 
We assume that an Internet user with identity ID s hope to ac-
ess the data of a sensor node with identity ID r . The user ﬁrst
enerates a query message m and runs the SC algorithm to get
he ciphertext σ = (U, C, V ) , where U = rP, C = m ⊕ h, and V =
 ID s + rX + x ID s Y . To resist the replay attack, we can concatenate
he query message and a timestamp to form a new message that
s signcrypted. Then the user sends the ciphertext, its identity ID s 
nd public key P K ID s to the gateway. 
When receiving the query message from the user, the gateway
rst checks if 
ˆ (P, V ) = ˆ e(P pub , Q ID s ) ˆ  e(U, X ) ˆ  e(P K ID s , Y ) olds. If the above equation does not hold, it refuses the query
equest. Otherwise, the user is authorized to access the data of
he sensor node with identity ID r . In this case, the gateway sends
he ( U , C ) to the sensor node. The sensor node ﬁrst computes
 = ˆ e(U, S ID r ) and h = H 2 (U, T , ID r ) . Then the sensor node recov-
rs the message m = C ⊕ h . Finally, the sensor node can encrypt
he collected data using a symmetric cipher (such as AES [31] )
ith the session key h and send the data to the user. The session
ey h is only known by the user and the sensor node and assures
he conﬁdentiality for future communication between them. In this
ommunication, conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication and non- 
epudiation are simultaneously achieved. 
An important advantage of the proposed CI-HSC signcryption
cheme is to achieves the public ciphertext authentication [32] .
y using this signcryption scheme, the gateway can verify the va-
idity and the origin of the ciphertext without knowing the mes-
age and getting any help from the intended receiver. Thus, we
an move the most of computational cost of USC from the sensor
odes to the gateway. Of course, a weakness of our scheme is that
he gateway may become the bottleneck. However, since the gate-
ay is more powerful than the sensor nodes, our method is rea-
onable. If required, the anonymity also can be achieved by scram-
ling the user’s identity ID s and public key P K ID s together with the
essage at the fourth step of SC algorithm. That is, we compute
 = (ID s || P K ID s || m ) ⊕ h instead of C = m ⊕ h . Of course, we should
odify the output value of H 2 to adapt the length of the encrypted
essage. Such changes do not affect the eﬃciency of our scheme. 
.4. Revocation 
The registration can be revoked automatically by adding the ex-
iration date in the identity. For example, when an Internet user
rst submits its identity ID to the SP. The SP uses a new iden-
ity “ID ||2015-12-31” to generate the partial private key. That is, the
P computes D ID = sQ ID , where Q ID = H 1 (ID || 2015-12-31). Thus, the
ser only can access the WSNs before December 31, 2015. How-
ver, if we have to revoke a user’s access privilege before the ex-
iration date due to some reasons, the SP can send the revoked
dentity to the gateway. The gateway should keep a list of revoked
dentities to identify the validity of users. 
.5. Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the performance and security
f our scheme. First, we compare the computational cost and
162 F. Li et al. / Computer Communications 89–90 (2016) 154–164 
Table 1 
Comparison of performance. 
Schemes Computational cost Sensor communication cost 
User Sensor Gateway Receive Transmit 
YHZXZ [13] 8M 3M 3M | Z ∗p | + 2 | G 1 | + | hash | + 2 | ID | 2 | Z ∗p | + | G 1 | + | hash | + 3 | ID | 
MXH [14] 2M 5M — | Z ∗p | + | m | + | G 1 | + | Cert| —





































































































d  communication cost of our scheme with those of YHZXZ [13] and
MXH [14] in Table 1 . 
We denote by M the point multiplication operation in G 1 , E
the exponentiation operation in G 2 and P the pairing operation.
The other operations are ignored in Table 1 since these operations
consume the most running time of the whole algorithm. | x | de-
notes the number of bits of x . Because both YHZXZ and MXH are
based on the PKI environment, we should verify the public key cer-
tiﬁcate before using a public key. Here we assume that the ellip-
tic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [33] is used to sign
a certiﬁcate. The ECDSA needs one point multiplication to sign a
message and two point multiplications to verify a signature. There-
fore, in YHZXZ, the gateway needs two point multiplications to
verify the user’s certiﬁcate and the user needs four point mul-
tiplications to verify the certiﬁcates of the gateway and sensor
node. In MXH, the sensor node needs two point multiplications
to verify the user’s certiﬁcate. From Table 1 , we know that our
scheme has less computational cost than YHZXZ and more com-
putational cost than MXH for the user. For the sensor node, our
scheme has the least computational cost among the three scheme.
For design an access control scheme for the WSNs in the context
of the IoT, the most important issue is to reduce the computa-
tional cost of the sensor node since its resource is very limited.
Therefore, our scheme is more practical than YHZXZ and MXH. For
the communication cost of the sensor node, YHZXZ needs more
cost since it is an interactive protocol. However, the sensor node
does not need to receive the certiﬁcate of the user because the
gateway assists to do it. In MXH, the sensor node should receive
the user’s certiﬁcate Cert to verify the validity. In our scheme, the
sensor node does not need to receive the user’s identity ID or
certiﬁcate. 
For both YHZXZ and MXH, we adopt the experiment result
in [34] on MICA2 that is equipped with an ATmega128 8-bit
processor clocked at 7.3728 MHz, 4 KB RAM and 128 KB ROM.
From [34] , we know that a point multiplication operation takes
0.81 s using an elliptic curve with 160 bits p that represents 80-
bit security level. For our scheme, we adopt the experiment re-
sult in [35] on the same processor ATmega128. A pairing op-
eration takes 1.9 s using the supersingular curve y 2 + y = x 3 +
x with an embedding degree 4 and implementing ηT pairing:
E(F 2 271 ) × E(F 2 271 ) → F 2 4 ·271 , which is also equivalent to the 80-
bit security level. According the results in [34,35] , the computa-
tional time on the sensor node of YHZXZ, MXH and our scheme are
3 ∗ 0 . 81 = 2 . 43 s, 5 ∗ 0 . 81 = 4 . 05 s and 1 ∗ 1 . 9 = 1 . 9 s, respectively.
As in [36,37] , we assume that the power level of MICA2 is 3.0 V,
the current draw in active mode is 8.0 mA, the current draw in re-
ceiving mode is 10 mA, the current draw in transmitting mode is
27 mA and the data rate is 12.4 kbps. For energy consumption, ac-
cording to the method in [14,38] , a point multiplication operation
consumes 3 . 0 ∗ 8 . 0 ∗ 0 . 81 = 19 . 44 mJ and a pairing operation con-
sumes 3 . 0 ∗ 8 . 0 ∗ 1 . 9 = 45 . 6 mJ. Therefore, the computational en-
ergy cost on the sensor node of YHZXZ, MXH and our scheme are
3 ∗ 19 . 44 = 58 . 32 mJ, 5 ∗ 19 . 44 = 97 . 2 mJ and 1 ∗ 45 . 6 = 45 . 6 mJ,
respectively. 
For the communication cost, we assume that | m | = 160 bits,
| hash | = 160 bits and | ID | = 80 bits. In addition, the size of certiﬁ-s  ate is at least 688 bits [17] . For both YHZXZ and MXH, the size
f an element in group G 1 is 1024 bits using an elliptic curve with
60 bits p . By standard compression technique [35,37] , the size of
n element in group G 1 can be reduced to 65 bytes. So, in YHZXZ,
he sensor node should receive 
 Z 
∗
p | + 2 | G 1 | + | hash | + 2 | ID | bits 
= 20 + 2 ∗ 65 + 20 + 2 ∗ 10 bytes = 190 bytes 
essages and transmit 
 | Z ∗p | + | G 1 | + | hash | + 3 | ID | bits 
= 2 ∗ 20 + 65 + 20 + 3 ∗ 10 bytes = 155 bytes 
essages. In MXH, the sensor node should receive 
 Z 
∗
p | + | m | + | G 1 | + | Cert| bits 
= 20 + 20 + 65 + 86 bytes = 191 bytes 
essages. Our scheme uses a curve over the binary ﬁeld F 2 271 . The
ize of an element in group G 1 is 542 bits. By standard compres-
ion technique, the size can be reduced to 34 bytes. So in our
cheme, the sensor node needs to receive 
 m | + | G 1 | bits = 20 + 34 bytes = 54 bytes 
essages. From [37] , we know the sensor node consumes 3 ∗ 27 ∗
 / 12400 = 0 . 052 mJ and 3 ∗ 10 ∗ 8 / 12400 = 0 . 019 mJ to transmit
nd receive one byte messages, respectively. Therefore, in YHZXZ,
he sensor communication energy consumption is 0 . 052 ∗ 155 +
 . 019 ∗ 190 = 11 . 67 mJ. In MXH, the communication energy con-
umption is 0 . 019 ∗ 191 = 3 . 63 mJ. In our scheme, the communica-
ion energy consumption is 0 . 019 ∗ 54 = 1 . 03 mJ. The total energy
onsumption of the three schemes are 58 . 32 + 11 . 67 = 69 . 99 mJ,
7 . 2 + 3 . 63 = 100 . 83 mJ and 45 . 6 + 1 . 03 = 46 . 63 mJ, respectively. 
The computational time and total energy consumption on the
ensor node are summarized in Figs. 3 and 4 , respectively. From
ig. 3 , we know that the computational cost of our scheme is re-
uced by about 22% and 53% compared to YHZXZ and MXH, re-
pectively. From Fig. 4 , we know that the energy consumption of
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Table 2 
Comparison of security. 
Schemes Security Environment 
Con Int Aut Non CipAut InsSec ForPro 
YHZXZ [13]     × × × PKI → PKI 
MXH [14]      ×  PKI → PKI 




































































































 ur scheme is reduced by about 33% and 54% compared to YHZXZ
nd MXH, respectively. Of course, the computational cost of gate-
ay in our scheme is higher than YHZXZ and MXH. We shift the
omputational cost of the sensor node to the gateway since our
cheme has the ciphertext authenticity. The ciphertext authenticity
llows the gateway to verify the ciphertext without the decryption.
We compare the security properties of the three schemes in
able 2 . In the “Security” column, Con, Int, Aut, Non, CipAut, In-
Sec and ForPro denotes conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication,
on-repudiation, ciphertext authenticity, insider security and for-
al proof, respectively. A symbol  means that the scheme satis-
es the security property and a symbol × means that the scheme
oes not satisfy the security property. Both YHZXZ and MXH do
ot satisfy the insider security [26] and our scheme has such se-
urity property. More importantly, our scheme allows a sender in
he CLC environment to transmit a message to a receiver in the
BC environment, which conforms the characteristics of the WSNs
n the context of the IoT. 
. Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed an eﬃcient heterogeneous signcryp-
ion scheme that allows a sender in the CLC environment to trans-
it a message to a receiver in the IBC environment. We proved
hat the proposed scheme has the IND-CCA2 under the GBDH
roblem and EUF-CMA under the GDH and CDH problems in the
andom oracle model. In addition, we gave a practical access con-
rol scheme without certiﬁcates for the WSNs in the context of the
oT using the novel heterogeneous signcryption. As compared with
xisting YHZXZ and MXH using traditional signcryption, the com-
utational cost of the sensor node in our scheme is reduced by
bout 22% and 53%, respectively and the energy consumption of
he sensor node in our scheme is reduced by about 33% and 54%,
espectively. eferences 
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